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The concept of antinatalism is now becoming popular on the Internet. Many 
online newspaper articles deal with this topic, and numerous academic papers on 
antinatalism have been published over the past ten years in the fields of 
philosophy and ethics.1 The word “antinatalism” was first used in the current 
meaning in 2006, when the two books that justify the universal negation of 
procreation were published: one by David Benatar and the other by Théophile de 
Giraud. However, we can find various prototypes of antinatalistic thoughts in 
ancient Greece, ancient India, and modern Europe. You might recall the name 
Schopenhauer.  
In this paper, I briefly summarize the history of antinatalistic thoughts and 
propose a set of categories on antinatalism and related thoughts. In October 
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2020, I published a Japanese book entitled Is It Better Never to Have Been 
Born?,2 in which I delved into the philosophies of the Upanishads, ancient 
Buddhism, Goethe, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Cioran, and Benatar from the 
perspective of contemporary antinatalism. Before going on to discussion, I 
would like to say that I am not an antinatalist, but I am not a pronatalist either. 
As a philosopher, I have been searching for the possibility of “birth affirmation,” 
but birth affirmation does not necessarily mean the negation of antinatalism. I 
will discuss it later again in Chapter 3. 
From a linguistic point of view, the root word “natal” in “antinatalism” 
comes from the Latin word nātālis, the original meaning of which is “of or 
relating to birth.”3 According to the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 
“natal” is an adjective that means “relating to the place where or the time when 
someone was born.” This shows that the literal meaning of “antinatalism” is the 
negation of being born. 
Taking this into consideration, I would like to define antinatalism as follows: 
 
The Definition of Antinatalism 
Antinatalism is the thought that all human beings or all sentient beings 
should not be born. 
 
This definition has two implications: one is that looking toward the past, we can 
say that all human beings or all sentient beings should not have been born, and 
the other is that looking toward the future, we can say that we should not give 
birth to our children. (Sometimes the latter one includes the negation of 
procreation of some or all sentient animals). I want to call the former idea “birth 
negation” and the latter idea “procreation negation.”  
Here, let us take a brief look at the definitions of antinatalism appearing in 
recent academic papers. Christopher Belshaw (2012) defines antinatalism as 
“the view that it’s better never to have been born and hence that procreation is 
wrong.”4 Belshaw’s definition is similar to mine, which refers to both birth 
negation and procreation negation. J. Robbert Zandbergen’s (2020) definition is 
as follows: “Antinatalism is the conviction that human existence is not 
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intrinsically more valuable than nonexistence. This incongruence at the heart of 
human reality may further inspire the conviction that human reproduction must 
be brought to an absolute halt.”5 Zandbergen also describes the two aspects of 
antinatalism in a slightly different way. Blake Hereth and Anthony Ferrucci 
(2021) define it as follows: “Anti-natalism is the view that it is morally 
impermissible to bring a child into existence. Anti-natalism is a moral position 
concerning prospective procreation. As such, it is a moral thesis against 
procreation for the purposes of bringing new humans into existence.”6 They 
interpret antinatalism with a special emphasis on procreation negation. In the 
same vein, Faith L. Brown and Lucas A. Keefer (2020) define it more simply: 
“Anti-natalism is the ethical view that it is morally wrong for people to 
reproduce.”7 All four definitions do not mention the reproduction of sentient 
beings, which is a big theme of antinatalism among today’s grassroots 
antinatalists.8 On the other hand, the Facebook group “Antinatalism,” which is 
one of the oldest networking sites for grassroots antinatalists, defines 
antinatalism as follows: “Anti-natalism (or antinatalism) is a philosophical 
position that assigns a negative value to birth.” Their definition seems to 
incorporate birth negation, procreation negation, and sentient beings’ coming 
into existence altogether.9 The entry of “antinatalism” in the April 2021 edition 
of English Wikipedia writes, “Antinatalism, or anti-natalism, is the ethical view 
that negatively values coming into existence and procreation, and judges 
procreation as morally wrong.”10  
As is evident from the above, there is no single, universal definition of 
antinatalism so far. By turning our eyes to the history of ideas and tracing the 
formation process of antinatalistic thoughts, we can shed new light on the 
concept of antinatalism. 
 
2. A Brief History of Antinatalistic Thoughts 
 
The idea of birth negation is found in ancient Greece. It then influenced 
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European literature and philosophy up to the present day. The idea of 
procreation negation appeared in the 20th century. In addition to the above two 
negations, there was a third type — “reincarnation negation” — found in ancient 
India. Theravāda Buddhist practitioners are pursuing this kind of negation even 
today.  
Kateřina Lochmanová and Karim Akerma call antinatalistic thoughts found 
before the 20th century “antinatalistic spirit” or “proto-antinatalism.”11 I want to 
enlarge the concept of proto-antinatalism to include ancient India’s reincarnation 
negation. And I want to call the idea of universal negation of procreation that 





As you can see in Figure 1, antinatalism is composed of three groups of 
antinatalistic thoughts: 1) proto-antinatalism as birth negation on the first floor, 
2) proto-antinatalism as reincarnation negation on the first floor, and 3) 
anti-procreationism on the second floor. The reason why the second floor is on 
top of the proto-antinatalism as birth negation is that while birth negation is 
frequently mentioned in the discourse on anti-procreationism (e.g., Benatar’s 
book), reincarnation negation is hardly discussed there.12  
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 5
Let us examine these three categories one by one. 
 
1) Proto-antinatalism as birth negation 
 
This is an antinatalism that emerged in ancient Greece. In B.C. Greece, 
Theognis, Sophocles, and many others wrote poems and plays about the idea 
that “the best thing is not to be born, and the next best thing is to return quickly 
to where we came from.”  
For example, Sophocles writes in his Oedipus at Colonus as follows. 
 
Never to be born is the best story.  
But when one has come to the light of day  
second-best is to leave and go back  
quick as you can back where you came from.13 
 
This is a combination of the negation of human birth and the affirmation of 
human death. Please note that what Sophocles argues above is a universal 
negation of coming into existence, not just a personal regret of having been born. 
Similar text can be found in Theognis’s Elegeia 425-428. Those authors 
compare humans’ being born with humans’ not being born and conclude that not 
being born is better than being born. The idea of birth negation was prevalent 
around the Mediterranean region at that time. We can see an example of that 
influence in Ecclesiastes (Coheleth) of the Old Testament. 
 
And I thought the dead, who have already died,  
more fortunate than the living, who are still alive;  
but better than both is the one who has not yet been,  
and has not seen the evil deeds that are done under the sun.14 
 
Similar ideas are also found in the Gnostic scriptures. These ideas sometimes 
accompany a somewhat personal lamenting that “it would have been better 
never to have been born.” For example, we can find such an expression in 
Goethe’s Faust, Book One. The rejuvenated Faust visits his girlfriend Gretchen, 
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and he discovers that she has gone insane. Faust cries in despair. 
 
I wish I had never been born! (O, wär’ ich nie geboren!)15 
 
This is the most moving part of Book One of Faust.  
The Greek type of birth negation further influenced Schopenhauer, Cioran, 
Benatar, and other antinatalists in the present day. For instance, Schopenhauer 
writes that the most important truth is the recognition that “it would have been 
better if we had never existed (Wir besser nicht dawären).”16 Cioran writes, 
“Not coming into existence is, no doubt, the best possible formula (Ne pas naître 
est sans contredit la meilleure formule qui soit).”17 Schopenhauer and Cioran 
make a universal statement concerning birth negation.  
At the same time, a personalized expression of birth negation is widely seen 
in contemporary society. We sometimes encounter the lament of birth negation 
in current literature, comics, and popular music (Remember UK rock band 
Queen’s lyrics in Bohemian Rhapsody: “Mama, ooh, I don’t want to die, I 
sometimes wish I’d never been born at all”). It is still vividly alive today. 
I think that a universal negation of birth (“Never to be born is the best 
story”) and a personalized lamenting of birth (“I wish I had never been born!”) 
should be theoretically separated from each other, although these two are 
actually closely connected. While the former is an authentic proto-antinatalism, 
the latter is not considered an authentic proto-antinatalism because it talks only 
about the speaker’s personal inner lamentations. The latter should rather be 
considered fertile soil that helps the former to flourish. 
The combination of a universal negation of birth and a personalized 
lamenting of birth sometimes creates attitudes of looking at life and the world 
from a negative and pessimistic perspective. Benatar’s “pragmatic pessimism” 
might be one of them. He recommends us to “embrace the pessimistic view, but 
navigate its currents in one’s life.” He says, “It is possible to be an unequivocal 
pessimist but not dwell on these thoughts all the time.”18 We may call such an 
attitude a proto-antinatalistic way of living. 
Lochmanová offers a slightly different interpretation of the Greek type of 
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birth negation. She writes that “the ancient antinatalistic reflections should be 
marked as rather passive, since neither of those lamentations result in a proposal 
for a concrete solution.”19 She is correct in saying that ancient Greeks did not 
reach a pragmatic proposal for preventing procreation. She calls this type of 
birth negation the antinatalism “in the broader sense” and distinguishes it from 
“the narrow-sense antinatalism,” whose central theme is “the idea of extinction 
of mankind.”20  
 
2) Proto-antinatalism as reincarnation negation 
 
This is an antinatalism found mainly in ancient India. It is a negation of the 
re-birth of a person after death. The ancient Indians believed that after death, the 
human self (atman, attan) or the five skandhas reincarnate into other sentient 
beings (including humans) and that this reincarnation continues endlessly. This 
means that life with suffering continues forever. To avoid this, ancient Buddhist 
practitioners attempted to attain nirvana through various practices. When a state 
of nirvana is reached in this human world, a person’s samsara ceases, and he or 
she will not be born again into any world.  
The Sutta Nipāta describes a Buddhist practitioner’s reaching a state of 
nirvana as follows: 
 
Rebirth had been ended: a noble life had been led: what was to be done 
had been done and there was nothing else to be done in this earthly 
existence: Sundarika-Bhāradvāja had become one of the arahants.21 
 
This is a unique type of antinatalism because the practitioner practices in the 
hope that he or she will not be born into any world in the future. Not only in 
ancient times but also today, this is the unchanging goal of Theravāda Buddhist 
practitioners. According to ancient Buddhism, all births are births into the world 
of suffering; hence, coming into existence must be evaluated negatively. If we 
focus on this aspect, we can say that ancient Buddhism is antinatalist. However, 
we can also interpret ancient Buddhism as saying that being born into this 
human world is affirmed because there is a possibility of reaching nirvana here. 
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 8
Therefore, if we pay attention to this aspect, we cannot instantaneously say that 
it is antinatalist.  
As for childbearing, although the practitioners themselves do not procreate, 
they do not think that all humans should not procreate. Because practitioners 
who do not attain nirvana in this world will need to be born again in this world 
through reincarnation in the future, it is necessary that non-practitioners in our 
society continue to procreate children. Considering all the above, we can say it 
is true that ancient Buddhism contains the idea of reincarnation negation; 
however, we need further research to make clear whether it can be called an 
authentic proto-antinatalism. The Upanishads share the idea of reincarnation 
negation with Buddhism, but in a slightly different way. They believed that our 
world is a world of suffering and that those who know the sacred truth of 
reincarnation proceed on the “path to the gods” after death, escaped from 
reincarnation cycles, and reach the world of eternity. A majority of 
contemporary antinatalists in Europe and the English-speaking world do not 
seem to have taken these forms of proto-antinatalism into their perspectives. 
One thing we have to consider is whether we can call Indian reincarnation 
negation antinatal-“ism.” This is because they did not necessarily argue that all 
human beings should transcend reincarnation or stop procreation. The target of 
their enlightenment was basically restricted to each individual practitioner, not 
the human race as a whole.  
One of the important gifts the ancient Indians gave to antinatalism is the idea 
of veganism/vegetarianism. Ancient Indian religions generally believed that 
sentient beings and human beings are deeply connected with each other through 
an infinite process of reincarnation. Among them, Jainism strictly refrained from 
eating animals and insects in order not to directly harm their lives. Their 
veganism is considered to have remotely influenced today’s vegan antinatalists. 
By the way, it was Schopenhauer who boldly combined the above two types 
of proto-antinatalism: the Greek type of birth negation and the Indian type of 
reincarnation negation. He argues, on the one hand, that the most important truth 
is the recognition that it would have been better if we had never existed (the 
Greek type of birth negation); on the other hand, he argues that what is most 
important for us is to dismantle our will to life/live and reach a state of 
will-less-ness and the cessation of reincarnation (The Indian type of 
reincarnation negation). Schopenhauer is a unique philosopher who integrated 
two traditions of proto-antinatalism and prepared the 20th century’s 
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anti-procreationism.22 It is worth noticing that Schopenhauer has a positive 
attitude toward universal procreation negation when he talks about Augustine’s 




This is an antinatalism that argues that we should not give birth to children 
and that the human race should become extinct by giving up procreation. This 
type of antinatalism appeared in the 20th century. The reason for this is that 
effective contraceptive methods were developed, the influence of religion was 
relatively weakened, and global environmental problems became more serious. 
Karim Akerma considers Kurnig as the first modern anti-procreationist 
figure who was under the influence of Schopenhauer but succeeded in freeing 
himself from Schopenhauer’s metaphysics. Kurnig published a book called 
Neo-Nihilism in 1903. According to Akerma, this was the first time in history 
that an entire book was devoted to anti-procreationism.24 In his 1941 book On 
the Tragic, Norwegian philosopher Peter Wessel Zapffe argued that human 
beings should decrease their population to the “below replacement rates” and 
become extinct.25 In the 1970s, population explosion and global environmental 
destruction became a huge international problem, and the idea emerged that the 
human race is the cancer of the earth. Austrian novelist Thomas Bernhard writes 
in his 1971 novel Gehen that “the earth, on which there are no human beings, 
attained by gradual extinction, would be, needless to say, the most beautiful.”26 
In 1991, Les U. Knight began The Voluntary Human Extinction Movement 
(VHEMT) and called for the extinction of the human race. They say “Phasing 
out the human species by voluntarily ceasing to breed will allow Earth’s 
biosphere to return to good health” on their website.27 
In 2006, David Benatar published the book Better Never to Have Been: The 
Harm of Coming into Existence, and he demonstrated that not being born is 
                                                     
22 I conducted a comprehensive examination of Schopenhauer’s antinatalism in Chapter 3 of Morioka 
(2020). Eduard von Hartmann took over Schopenhauer’s concept of will-less-ness and argued that 
when the human race succeeds in removing its will to life, all the will existing in the universe will 
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24 Akerma (2020), p. 126. 
25 Tangenes (2004).  
26 Bernhard (1971), p. 21.  
27 http://www.vhemt.org/ (Accessed April 18, 2021). 
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better than being born, based on the idea of philosophical asymmetry between 
pleasure and pain. According to Benatar, human beings’ coming into existence is 
always a harm; therefore, we should not give birth to children. Benatar calls this 
way of thinking an “anti-natalist position” or an “anti-natalist view.”28 He says 
that his argument arises “not from a dislike of children, but instead from a 
concern to avoid the suffering of potential children and the adults they would 
become.” He argued that the number of people should become zero, and 
“extinction within a few generations is to be preferred.”29 
The word “antinatalism” had long been used to refer to population 
suppression policies, such as China’s One Child Policy, in the field of social 
science. (On the contrary, population growth policies had been called 
pronatalism).30 At this point, the word did not yet have the connotations of 
today’s anti-procreationism, where individuals should take the initiative to 
refrain from procreation and exterminate the human race. It was Benatar who 
introduced this word into philosophy and added an anti-procreationist meaning 
to it. This was an epoch-making event. The Wikipedia entry on “antinatalism” 
was created in 2007, a year after the publication of Benatar’s book. In that entry, 
antinatalism was defined as “the philosophical position that asserts a negative 
value judgement towards birth.”31 
Another proponent of antinatalism is Belgian writer Théophile de Giraud. 
He also published a book in 2006, entitled L’Art de guillotiner les procréateurs: 
Manifeste anti-nataliste (The Art of Guillotining Procreators: An Anti-Natalist 
Manifesto), and expressed his view against procreation. The book, written in 
French, devotes its entire pages to the discussion of the negation of procreation 
and is considered one of the most important books about anti-procreationism, 
comparable to Benatar’s. In the introduction of the book, de Giraud writes, 
“Philosophy has debated all the questions that came before the human mind, but 
there is only one exception: the ethical validity of procreation.”32 He goes on to 
argue that birth is one of the three major human sufferings, exposes the 
psychological mindset of birth advocates, asks whether children can really love 
their parents, says that children have the right to denounce their parents, says 
that ethics and birth are incompatible, considers global overpopulation, 
                                                     
28 Benatar (2006), p. 8. 
29 Benatar (2006), p. 198. 
30 See, for example, Heitlinger (1991) and Cheng (1991). 
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32 de Giraud (2006), p. 7. 
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considers the conditions for parents to have children, and discusses the 
relationship between feminism and antinatalism. His pessimistic view of being 
born seems to have been heavily influenced by Schopenhauer. While Benatar 
approached the subject with the logic of analytical philosophy, de Giraud 
approached the subject with the method of continental philosophy and literature. 
He argues that the first articles of all charters aiming at protecting the 
interests of the child should be as follows: 
 
1. The first right of the child is not to be born. 
2. The second right of the child consists in being able to summon before 
the courts, if he considers it necessary, those who seriously harmed him 
by violating his first right.33 
 
Thus, he holds that children should be able to sue their parents for giving birth to 
them. Also, de Giraud talks about the relationship between antinatalism and 
feminism in Chapter 10 entitled “Remedy through Feminism.” This is a 
perspective that is lacking in Benatar. 
It is not clear when antinatalist activism emerged in the English-speaking 
world. The Facebook group “Antinatalism” was created in 2007, which was 
perhaps the earliest Internet site for the discussion of this topic.34 EFILism is an 
early example of such activism. It was proposed by YouTuber Inmendham 
around 2010 and states that the DNA mechanism by which life reproduces itself 
and the emergence of sentient beings have caused ongoing suffering in this 
universe. Inmendham argues that the termination of the reproduction of human 
beings and sentient beings will be the solution.35 The first four letters of 
EFILism are a reverse reading of LIFE. The publication of Benatar’s Better 
Never to Have Been in 2006 had a major theoretical impact on antinatalist 
activism. (However, it should be noted that many current antinatalists do not 
necessarily agree with Benatar’s ideas.) One of the places where antinatalism 
has been discussed in the English-speaking world is Reddit.com, which is a huge 
collection of posting forums, and the antinatalism thread (r/antinatalism) was 
created there in 2010. Cory Stieg writes that “Benatar’s concept has taken on a 
                                                     
33 de Giraud (2006), p. 82. 
34 https://www.facebook.com/groups/antinatalism/ The name of the site when it was created was 
“Anti-natalism,” and then it was renamed “Antinatalism.”  
35 http://www.efilism.com/ (Accessed April 5, 2021). 
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new life, so to speak, among Redditers, YouTube communities, and vegan 
advocacy groups. Online, antinatalists have created a safe space to talk about 
their experiences, share memes about natalism, and geek out about 
philosophy.”36 According to efilism.com, several of the above trends came 
together in a big wave in 2011, which gave birth to the antinatalism 
community.37 A booklet entitled The Antinatalist Manifesto was published in 
2016 by an author named Antiprocreation. It argues that we were created 
forcibly without being asked whether it was okay to give birth and that 
procreation is a violation of human dignity, human rights, and freedom.38 
Jiwoon Hwang, the real name of Antiprocreation, started publishing a magazine 
entitled The Antinatalism Magazine in 2017. He also published the blog post 
“Why it is always better to cease to exist (pro-mortalism, promortalism)” and 
advocated pro-mortalism in 2018.39 
On September 18, 2017, the international academic conference 
“Antinatalism: To Be or Not to Be?” was held at the Faculty of Philosophy, 
University of Ostrava, Czech Republic. Kateřina Lochmanová and others, who 
would later edit the book History of Antinatalism, gave presentations. It may be 
the first international conference on the subject of antinatalism. On May 30, 
2018, the international conference “Antinatalism Under Fire” was held in 
Prague with participants including David Benatar, Iddo Landau, Saul Smilansky, 
and Jiwoon Hwang. 
In 2020, an activist group called “Antinatalism International” was founded 
and began its vigorous activities on the Internet. According to them, the most 
succinct expression of antinatalism is “Antinatalism is a critique of procreation.” 
And they say that “[a]ntinatalism, in general, argues that creating life is 
unethical because of the existence of suffering and that the best outcome is 
extinction.” They exemplify the four schools of anti-procreative thought: 
antinatalism, EFILism, the VHEMT, and childfree (a lifestyle of voluntary 
childlessness). 40  They have published An Antinatalist Handbook on their 
website, refuting every question that is raised against antinatalism and every 
                                                     
36 Stieg (2019).  
37 http://www.efilism.com/ 
38 Antiprocreation (2016). He also published Antiprocreation (2017). 
39 Hwang (2018). I met him at the First International Conference on Philosophy and Meaning in Life, 
held at Hokkaido University in 2018. He attempted suicide and then passed away in the same year at 
the young age of 23. See Burmazovic (2018).  
40 https://antinatalisminternational.com/what-is-antinatalism/#1601628649736-f2e278a6-0b08 
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justification for procreation made by pronatalists. Antinatalist activism in the 
English-speaking world seems to have focused its campaign goals on the 
extinction of the human race that is achieved by the termination of all human 
procreations and, if possible, the extinction of all sentient beings. However, 
antinatalist activists’ activities are diverse, and it is impossible to define them 
from a single perspective. 
 
The academic study of the history of antinatalism has only just begun. Ken 
Coates’s Anti-Natalism: Rejectionist Philosophy from Buddhism to Benatar, 
published in 2014, is perhaps the earliest example of such work. He located the 
origin of antinatalism in Hinduism and ancient Buddhism and overviewed the 
antinatalism of Schopenhauer, Eduard von Hartmann, Peter Wessel Zapffe, 
Benatar, Beckett, and Sartre. In 2017, Karim Akerma published in German the 
encyclopedic Antinatalismus: Ein Handbuch (Antinatalism: A Handbook). This 
736-page book includes entries and quotations concerning antinatalism from a 
variety of literatures. In 2020, I published the Japanese book Is It Better Never to 
Have Been Born? In this book, I examined the history of antinatalism from a 
different perspective than Coates, starting with ancient Greece and ancient India, 
to Schopenhauer and other thinkers in the 20th century, and I criticized 
Benatar’s harmful birth theory. I also proposed a basic framework of the concept 
of “birth affirmation,” which will be a foundation of my future book A 
Philosophy of Birth Affirmation. Also in 2020, Kateřina Lochmanová edited the 
book History of Antinatalism: How Philosophy Has Challenged the Question of 
Procreation, which examined in detail the history of Western antinatalism from 
ancient Greece through medieval Europe to the present day. This book provides 
a rich source of information about antinatalistic thoughts that we have never 
been able to know before. 
The academic study on antinatalistic topics has also just begun in recent 
years. Concerning the problem of non-existence of consent, Seana Valentine 
Shiffrin (1999) and Asheel Singh (2018) are important papers. Concerning the 
justification of procreation, Christine Overall (2012) and Rivka Weinberg (2016) 
are important books. Among them, Weinberg’s “principle of procreative 
permissibility” is intriguing. She proposes two principles for procreation: the 
principle of motivation restriction and the principle of procreative balance. The 
former makes mandatory the parents’ motivation for raising a child, and the 
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latter sets the range of reasonably acceptable risks for permissible procreation.41 
Although Weinberg’s idea is not necessarily the one that can solve the problem 
of antinatalism, I believe it has the potential to inspire new ideas in the field of 
philosophy of procreation.42 
Julio Cabrera, who has long advocated the concept of “negative ethics,” 
argues in his 2020 paper “Antinatalism and Negative Ethics” that antinatalism 
should be strengthened by his idea of negative ethics. Generally speaking, 
antinatalism argues that our life is not worth starting, but it does not necessarily 
argue that it is not worth continuing. Cabrera does not think so. If we think that 
life can be considered worth continuing, then, “this can weaken the thesis that 
life is never worth-starting and give some force to natalism.”43 According to 
Cabrera, “human life should be regarded as ethically not worth-continuing in 
general even when sensibly tolerable.”44 However, he does not recommend 
immediate suicide motivated just by fear or weakness, because life-ending must 
be “morally guided.”45 
J. Robbert Zandbergen writes in his 2020 paper “Between Iron Skies and 
Copper Earth: Antinatalism and the Death of God” that antinatalism is “the most 
radically modern phenomenon that emerged after the death of God, and 
represents the most radical face of secular humanism.”46 He argues that after the 
declaration of the death of God by Nietzsche, humans had to reconstruct the 
foundation of their value system, and antinatalism provided us with its most 
radical answer, the extinction of the human race. However, Zandbergen does not 
think that the negation of procreation is the essential core of antinatalism. He 
writes that “it is a common misconception that antinatalism is unduly focused on 
reproduction and, more importantly, the cessation thereof. It is important to 
understand that the policy recommendation concerning reproduction only flows 
from a deeper concern with the state of human existence overall. As will be 
shown here, the conviction that human existence holds no intrinsic value over 
nonexistence is the core of antinatalism.”47 Thus, he suggests that the idea that 
not being born is better than being born, which can be found in 
                                                     
41 Weinberg (2016), pp. 176-180. 
42 In Morioka (2020), I added the third principle, “the principle of responsibility,” to Weinberg’s two 
principles to resolve the problem of non-existence of consent by a newborn child (p. 302). 
43 Cabrera (2020), p. 187. 
44 Cabrera (2020), p. 167. 
45 Cabrera (2020), p. 185. 
46 Zandbergen (2020), p. 2 (online version). 
47 Zandbergen (2020), p. 7 (online version). 
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proto-antinatalism as birth negation, might be the essential core of antinatalism, 
and anti-procreationism is a result that has emerged “inspired” by birth negation. 
Faith L. Brown and Lucas A. Keefer’s paper “Anti-Natalism from an 
Evolutionary Psychological Perspective” (2020) discusses antinatalism in terms 
of evolutionary psychology. They think that there must be psychological reasons 
or factors that encourage people to accept or resist antinatalistic ideas. In 
addition to an optimism bias, which Benatar has already mentioned in his book, 
they point out four factors: a fast life history, sex differences, altruism, and 
attachment security. They conclude, respectively, that 1) higher-class individuals 
prefer antinatalism; 2) females are more attracted by antinatalism than males; 3) 
females in general and people who have experienced huge sufferings choose 
antinatalism because they think seriously about the quality of life of future 
children; and 4) people who have a distrust of others and avoid intimate 
attachment are likely to have pessimism and are likely to be drawn to 
antinatalism. Although these are still just hypotheses, they strongly emphasize 
that antinatalism research in psychology will be very meaningful. I hope that 
there will be some positive feedback from psychology to philosophy in the 
future. 
 
3. Categorization of Antinatalist Concepts 
 
Here, I would like to leave the history of ideas and move on to a discussion 
of the concept of antinatalism itself. There is a wide variety of concepts of 
antinatalism. The following is a rough draft of my categorization. This is a 
categorization of antinatalism and its related concepts, not a categorization of 
antinatalists. One can have more than one of the following categories at the 
same time. 
 
A: All births are bad. (Being born is bad. Giving birth is bad.) 
* All births are always bad. 
[A-1: Benatar’s type] This argument claims that coming into existence is 
always a harm, which is based on the asymmetry of pleasure and pain that 
the presence of pain is bad, but the absence of pleasure is not bad. 
[A-2: Pain avoidance theory] If we had not been born, we would never have 
felt pain. If we do not procreate, children who could feel pain will never 
come into being.  
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* All births are bad as a whole. 
[A-3: Russian roulette type] If we continue giving birth, at least one baby 
will be unhappy after growing up. Even if there are many children who will 
be happy, at least one child in the next generation will become unhappy, so 
we must consider childbirth to be bad as a whole in the sense that it will 
always produce that one child somewhere. 
*[A-4: Non-existence of consent] Consent from a newborn child is absent. 
*[A-5: Diversity tolerant type] All births are bad. All people should not 
procreate. But it must be acceptable for others to hold pronatalist views, and it 
must be acceptable for others to hold wrong views. 
B: [B-1: “Birth negation” type] Being born is bad. I wish we had not been born. 
But I do not necessarily evaluate the goodness or badness of giving birth. 
C: Being born is not necessarily bad. 
*[C-1: “Procreation negation” type] Being born is not necessarily bad, but 
giving birth is always bad. 
*[C-2: “Reincarnation negation” type] Rebirth in other worlds (or in this 
world) by reincarnation should be stopped. Rebirth in the next world has 
positive meaning only if a practitioner wishes to reach a state of nirvana after a 
series of succeeding reincarnations. 
*[C-3: Childfree] I do not give birth. I do not argue that all people should never 
procreate. 
D: [D-1: Negation of the “promotion of procreationism”] Forcing someone to 
give birth is always bad. Procreation ideologies promoted by a nation, society, 
relatives, men, and others should be abolished. 
E: Sentient being-oriented antinatalism. (This may include aliens and AI/robots 
that can experience pain). 
*[E-1: Domestic animal type] All cattle rearing should be abolished (before 
voluntary human extinction occurs). 
*[E-2: Sentient being type] All sentient beings should become extinct. 
*[E-3: Biotechnological approach type] All pain in sentient creatures should be 
artificially removed. 
F: [F-1: Biological life-centered type] All living beings should become extinct. 
G: [G-1: Non-existence type] No beings should exist. Complete nothingness is 
preferable. The strongest negation. 
 
Using the above categorization, I consider the following grouping. 
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*Antinatalism in the narrow sense: A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4 
*Antinatalism in the broad sense: A-5, B-1, C-1, C-2, E-1, E-2 
*Anti-procreationism: A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, C-1, E-1, E-2 
* C-3, D-1, E-3, F-1, and G-1 are not antinatalism. 
 
The above categorization is not intended to cover all patterns of antinatalism. 
Each category includes cases where there is a specific advocate (e.g., A-1) and 
cases where there is not necessarily a specific advocate (e.g., A-5). Since there 
could be various categorizations other than my own, I would be happy if you 
could use this as a reference when making your categorization. 
I am not an antinatalist myself, although I hold the idea of “birth negation” 
deep in my heart. I myself am closest to the “birth negation” type (B-1). 
However, while the birth negation type of antinatalism makes a universal claim 
that “it would have been better if we had never been born,” I only have a 
personal view that “it would have been better if I had never been born.” In this 
single respect, I must say I am not an antinatalist. However, at the same time, I 
am not a pronatalist either, because I do not necessarily think that the human 
race should continue to procreate. I will discuss this point later in the Appendix. 
By the way, to overcome my inner birth negation, I have advocated in my 
books and papers the concept of “birth affirmation,” which means that I am truly 
glad that I have been born. This “birth affirmation” is also a very personal one, 
and I do not believe that all people should affirm their own birth. I believe that 
the possibility of birth affirmation is open to all people, but it is up to each 
individual to decide whether to pursue this possibility, and I also believe that 
birth affirmation does not necessarily lead to a life of high value. 
Furthermore, birth affirmation is not necessarily in conflict with 
anti-procreationism. It is possible that an anti-procreationist devotes all her life 
to the promotion of anti-procreationism, and, as a result, her attempt becomes 
successful, and she reaches a state of “birth affirmation” and feels happy to able 
to achieve her ultimate goal. The relationship between birth affirmation and 
antinatalism includes many profound issues like this, so further research is 
needed. Those who are interested in the concept of birth affirmation, please read 
my paper “What is Birth Affirmation?: The Meaning of Saying ‘Yes’ to Having 
Been Born,” which is to be published in June 2021, and the English translation 
of Chapter 4 of my 2013 book Manga Introduction to Philosophy. 
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4. The Validity of Antinatalism in the Narrow Sense 
 
In this chapter, we will examine the validity of “antinatalism in the narrow 
sense.” Antinatalism in the narrow sense — that is to say, [A-1: Benatar’s type], 
[A-2: Pain avoidance theory], [A-3: Russian roulette type], and [A-4: 
Non-existence of consent] — asserts that all human births are universally bad 
and therefore all procreation should not take place. These four theories can be 
constructed as independent, consistent thoughts on human procreation. However, 
they are not strong enough to be able to assert that only their position is correct 
and that other ideas of affirming procreation are universally wrong. I would like 
to discuss this point very briefly in the following. Please keep in mind that I do 
not intend to say that antinatalism cannot be established as a meaningful 
philosophical theory on birth and procreation. It can. What I want to emphasize 
is that it is wrong for such a theory to claim that only its position is universally 
correct and that other theories affirming procreation are all wrong and should be 
abolished. 
 
A-1: Benatar’s type 
This argument claims that coming into existence is always a harm, which is 
based on the asymmetry of pleasure and pain that the presence of pain is bad, 
but the absence of pleasure is not bad. If there is a prick of a needle in a person’s 
life, the life of the person as a whole necessarily becomes a bad one. Therefore, 
it can be universally asserted that being born is always worse than not being 
born, and therefore all births should not be carried out. This idea, already found 
in Schopenhauer, was theorized by Benatar’s Better Never to Have Been, which 
took over the debates that had been conducted by Jan Narveson and Hermann 
Vetter in the 20th century.48 Philosophers have debated whether Benatar’s 
argument is correct, and Benatar has attempted to refute their objections. In my 
observation, some of the objections made by David Boonin (2012) and Erik 
Magnusson (2019), especially Boonin’s argument of the Relational Symmetry 
Principle and Magnusson’s discussion of counterfactual conditionals, succeed in 
pinpointing Benatar’s weaknesses.49 I made a criticism of Benatar’s argument in 
                                                     
48 Narveson (1967); Vetter (1969), (1971). 
49 Boonin (2012), pp. 15-25; Magnusson (2019), p. 4. But I do not necessarily agree with all the 
arguments in their papers. 
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Chapter 7 of my Japanese book (2020) from the perspective of Sein and Werden, 
and in my Japanese paper (2021) I argued that there can be a rival theory that is 
stronger than Benatar’s asymmetry theory. 50  I believe that some of my 
criticisms there are critical to Benatar’s argument.51 I cannot show the details of 
the above discussions here because of the word limit, but putting all of them 
together, I believe that the Benatar-type defense of antinatalism is not as strong 
as Benatar himself claims it to be. 
 
A-2: Pain avoidance theory 
If people are born, they will necessarily experience suffering. If people are 
not born, they will never experience suffering. Therefore, to fundamentally 
prevent suffering, we should stop all procreation. 
There are two problems with this. 
The first problem is that although this theory is based on the premise that it 
is better to have no existence and no suffering than to have existence and 
suffering, there is no logical ground for this premise to be universally true. In 
other words, when someone argues that “a life that has reached a state of joy by 
overcoming past painful experiences is not inferior to the (hypothetical) state 
that there is no pain because a life does not exist,” the pain avoidance theory 
cannot provide a basis for rejecting that argument as false. This is because the 
pain avoidance theory focuses only on the existence or non-existence of pain 
and does not take into account any positive sides that pleasure and joy can bring 
to life. The only way for proponents of the pain avoidance theory to refute the 
above argument would be to reply that the mere presence of pain in life makes 
that life unworthy of beginning, or that the mere presence of pain, no matter 
what great pleasure or joy there might be, ruins the entire positive value of that 
pleasure or joy. However, the former is unable to disprove the above argument 
because it still does not explain the reason why the absence of pain is considered 
universally “better” than the presence of both pain and pleasure. In other words, 
the pain avoidance theory argues that since we necessarily experience pain once 
we are born, it would be better if we were not born at all, but behind this 
argument is the hidden assumption that we do not need to take into account 
anything other than pain when we consider the goodness or badness of being 
born. However, this assumption is not proven to be correct at all. The latter is an 
                                                     
50 Morioka (2020), (2021). 
51 I will try to translate them into English and make it open to international readers. 
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argument for asymmetrical comparison of pain and pleasure; hence, it has the 
same difficulty as Benatar’s type. 
The second problem arises if the pain avoidance theory takes into account 
the amount of pain and argues that small pains can be cancelled out by pleasure 
or joy, but large pains can never be cancelled out no matter how much pleasure 
or joy there might be. First, if small pains can be canceled out by pleasure or joy, 
then the pain avoidance theory cannot conclude that birth is universally bad, 
because it is possible to live a whole life without experiencing large pains that 
cannot be canceled out by pleasure or joy. The pain avoidance theory cannot 
dismiss this possibility. And the line between small and large pain will be 
different for each person, which means that it is not possible to objectively 
determine what a universally bad life is. If we were to change the argument to 
the one that there will always be at least one person in the human race who will 
experience great pain that cannot be canceled out by pleasure or joy, it would 
become the Russian roulette type in the next section. 
 
A-3: Russian roulette type 
This argues that if human beings continue to give birth, there will be at least 
one person whose life will be an unhappy one; therefore, all births should not be 
carried out in order to prevent that one unhappy life from emerging. 
There are two problems with this. 
The first problem is that the Russian roulette theory cannot refute the 
position that “even if there is a person whose life is likely to be unhappy because 
of suffering, all births are permitted to take place if there is an effective function 
in society in which people actively support her and bring her out of her 
unhappiness.” If a Russian roulette theory advocate wishes to dismiss this, the 
advocate has no choice but to argue on the basis of possibility — i.e., that the 
practical possibility of establishing such an ideal society is so extremely low that 
it is pointless to set up such a position. However, such a counterargument allows 
for a counter counterargument of the same kind, namely, “Antinatalists say that 
if all births could be prohibited, there would be no suffering at all, but the 
practical possibility of such an ideal is extremely low, so it is pointless to set up 
such a position.” Thus, the strength of the counterargument and that of the 
counter counterargument would be on par with each other. Therefore, the 
Russian roulette theory cannot refute the above position. A corollary of this 
argument is that birth advocates have a strong obligation to help the people 
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whose lives are likely to be unhappy to escape from the path to unhappiness. 
The fulfillment of this obligation should be a prerequisite for procreation. Thus, 
the Russian roulette theory does not function as an almighty defense of 
antinatalism, but rather as an imposition of a strict moral norm on birth 
advocates. It is the birth advocates who must place the Russian roulette theory as 
the foundation of their argument. 
The second problem is the following. The Russian roulette theory is an 
argument that focuses only on the interests of the newborn and ignores the 
interests of the people who already exist in the world and are expected to bear 
children. However, it does not provide any logical ground that the interests of 
the existing people can be ignored when questioning the pros and cons of 
procreation. Of course, this point holds true for many types of 
anti-procreationism as well, but it is especially important for the Russian roulette 
type. The Russian roulette theory asserts that we must abandon the wishes of 
existing people that they want to experience the joy and happiness of bearing 
and raising children, that they want their children to experience the joy and 
happiness of living, and that they want to make every effort possible to achieve 
this, because there is the risk that at least one child will be unhappy. However, 
the Russian roulette theory fails to show a logical ground to support that “all 
hopes of childbearing among existing people” and “all possibilities of total 
happiness to be experienced by many children who will be born in the future” 
must be abandoned in order to prevent the birth of at least one child who will be 
unhappy. 
Antinatalists sometimes argue that procreation is a parental ego, but in our 
society we tolerate a variety of egos that may lower the well-being of others 
(e.g., my living in a certain nice rental property lowers the well-being of an 
unknown person who could have lived a civilized life only by living there, or 
my passing an entrance exam lowers the well-being of someone else who did 
not pass it), and antinatalists have to explain why procreation does not fall into 
such an acceptable range. If they try to answer this by saying that procreation, 
unlike those social activities, is the creation of a sentient being out of nothing, 
then their objection again comes back to the problem of the pain avoidance 
theory. Also, it is sometimes said that “antinatalism is a gentle thought that puts 
the interests of children first,” but the mere fact that it is a gentle thought does 
not prove that procreation is universally wrong. 
The following discussion may also be helpful. First of all, generally 
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speaking, there are cases in which the regulation of society by the Russian 
roulette theory is not feasible. Those are the cases in which (1) the benefits that 
would be lost by the regulation are so great that they would shake the whole 
society, and (2) there are no other alternatives to maintain the benefits. Example 
1: The regulation of “sexual harassment in the workplace.” In this case, (1) is 
not significant, and (2) exists (e.g., the use of cosplay brothels), so the regulation 
can be established. Example 2: The regulation of “private cars that may cause 
serious traffic accidents.” In this case, in the city center, (1) is not significant, 
and (2) exists, so the regulation can be established. In the countryside, (1) is 
significant, and (2) does not exist, so the regulation cannot be established (but 
some measures are needed to reduce the suffering caused by traffic accidents). 
Regarding the regulation of procreation, if the interests of existing people are 
also taken into account, (1) is significant, and (2) does not exist, so the 
regulation cannot be established. However, whether this argument can be 
sufficiently applied to the case of creating existence from nothing remains 
unclear and thus requires further investigation. 
In response to the above, those who say that not giving birth to any human 
being is the right answer because if we do not give birth to any human being, 
these problems themselves will not arise, are faced with the original question — 
“It is true that if we do not give birth to any human being, these problems will 
not arise, but why can we universally conclude from this that all of us should not 
give birth to any human being?” — and they are sent back to square one. 
At the same time, we need to think about the case in which every child born 
will certainly become unhappy. For example, let’s consider a case in which the 
earth’s environment drastically changes and unknown radiation falls on the earth, 
and all children born will surely experience unbearable suffering for the rest of 
their lives (adults are not affected by radiation because they are already fully 
grown). This is a Russian roulette game where every magazine is filled with live 
ammunition. In this case, we should refrain from having children. It is only in 
this and similar cases that the plausibility of anti-procreationism is confirmed. In 
the current situation, we can say that humans are not placed in such an 
environment because there are many people who end their lives with satisfaction. 
We can conclude from this that those who try to defend birth must continue to 
make great efforts to prevent our natural and social environment from becoming 
like this. (However, I do not believe that people should continue to procreate, 
because I am not a pronatalist.) 
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A-4: Non-existence of consent 
This is the argument that it is wrong to give birth to a child without the 
child’s consent to be born. This faces the following problems. First of all, it is 
impossible to obtain consent because there is no subject of consent before birth. 
When a subject of consent exists, it can be wrong to force that subject to do 
something without consent, but that logic cannot be applied when there is no 
such subject. Thus, we are led to the conclusion that we cannot say that it is 
wrong to give birth to a child because there is no consent, nor can we say that it 
is not wrong to give birth to a child because there is no consent. If one argues 
that any born child will necessarily suffer the pains of life without consent, this 
brings us back to the issue of the pain avoidance theory. This shows that the 
non-existence of consent theory alone cannot lead to any conclusions about the 
goodness or badness of procreating children. 
In response to this, it is sometimes argued that one should not give birth to a 
child in the first place, because after the child is born and grows up, the child 
may look back on her birth and raise the question to her parents, “Why did you 
give birth to me although I did not consent to it?” However, this is not a correct 
question to begin with, because it is based on the misconception that there is a 
subject of consent before birth. If it is not a misconception, then this argument 
again faces the problem of the previous paragraph. 
If this argument is intended to point the finger at the parents and say, “If you 
hadn’t given birth to me, I wouldn’t have to suffer, but because you gave birth to 
me, I am now suffering like this,” then we must say it is very one-sided. This 
resentment can be extended to further questions not related to procreation, such 
as, “Why didn’t you kill yourself when you were young? If you had, I wouldn’t 
have been born” and “Why did you choose to get married? If you hadn’t gotten 
married, I wouldn’t have been born.” It can even be extended to a grudge against 
grandparents: “Why did you give birth to my parents?” It can even go so far as 
to say to the nation of Japan, “Why did you lose the war? If you had not lost the 
war, I would not have been born.” It is extremely unbalanced in that although 
there is an infinite number of possible targets for resentment, it is focused only 
on the sexual intercourse of the parents at a certain point of time in their lives. 
While I can understand the sentiment of naming the parents who are closest to 
them, we have to say that their logic is weak and arbitrary. In addition, we can 
say that the mere personal grudge that “if you had not given birth, I would not 
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have suffered like this in the first place” does not reach the thought of 
antinatalism that “all births should not be carried out.” As I mentioned in 
Chapter 2, academic discussions on this topic are still going on; hence, further 
discussion is needed to settle the entire dispute on non-existence of consent. 
 
From all the above, we can conclude that the four forms of antinatalism in 
the narrow sense are not strong enough to declare that only their own position is 
correct and the idea of affirming procreation is universally wrong. What I have 
discussed in this chapter is no more than a brief sketch of the whole picture. 
Many topics and counterarguments remain undiscussed. 
Reading my discussion in this chapter, readers may wonder why the author 
of this paper is desperate to make a puzzle-solving of such absolute questions. It 
is easy to answer in saying that this is the very job a contemporary philosopher 
is supposed to do. But as a philosopher who has a flesh and blood body, I would 
like to say that the reason why I am doing this kind of messy job is that 
antinatalism is my own existential question. Since my childhood, I have been 
continuously repeating the question in mind, “Why have I been born even 
though I am destined to die someday?” and I have cried many times to myself, 
“If death is the unavoidable endpoint, I wish I had never been born!” For me, the 
question of birth negation has been an existential problem. And sometimes I 
have wondered why the extinction of the human race was not allowed because 
for me the happy death of a human being and the happy extinction of the human 
race were considered to be the best solution to my existential problem. At some 
point in my life, this idea changed into the idea of birth affirmation. And to make 
clear the concept of birth affirmation, I have been doing this kind of analytic and 
historical research. Basically, I am doing this for myself, not for anyone else. 
Nicholas Smyth stresses in his 2020 paper “What Is the Question to Which 
Anti-Natalism Is the Answer?” that a discussion on procreative ethics should be 
more existential. This is exactly what I want to say. He criticizes contemporary 
procreative ethicists because they “have mainly followed Benatar in continuing 
to write in highly impersonal terms about sufferings, harms and duties, usually 
in impartial and quantitative terms.” 52  Smyth insists that we should be 
“existentially grounding”53 when thinking seriously about antinatalism and the 
issues of meaning in life, and we should ask such true life questions to ourselves 
                                                     
52 Smyth (2020), pp. 77-78. 
53 Smyth (2020), p. 82. 
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who are living here and now. We should also make decisions ourselves, because 
no one will ever decide on our behalf. He writes that in the situation where a 
person is on her deathbed and looking back on her life asking whether it was 
meaningful, “there is absolute, categorical distinction between a person standing 
beside the bed and the person in the bed.”54 This is what I have called a 
“solipsistic layer” or the “heart of meaning in life” in my 2019 paper “A 
Solipsistic and Affirmation-Based Approach to Meaning in Life.”55 In this paper, 
I talked about the ontological status of a suffering person appearing in Viktor 
Frankl’s book, and I wrote that “whatever suffering this individual may 
experience her life occurs only once in this universe and can never be repeated 
in any other way in the future, and the manner in which this individual exists in 
this universe is unique and can never be compared with anything whatsoever.”56 
A person who is exiting in this manner should be the true target of philosophy of 
life’s meaning, and this is one of the basic backgrounds of my philosophical 
research on antinatalism and birth affirmation.57 
 
Appendix: How Antinatalism and Its Research Began in Japan 
 
Contemporary discussion of antinatalism began when Shuichi Kato 
published his Japanese book Life and Individuality in 2007, one year after 
Benatar’s book. At that time, Kato did not know Benatar’s argument; hence, his 
book did not refer to it. 
In his book, Kato took up the proposition “it is better not to have been born” 
and made a philosophical analysis of it. If we take antinatalism broadly, Kato’s 
book is considered the first example in Japan that comprehensively examined 
the topics of birth negation in antinatalism. After introducing antinatalistic 
thoughts in Theognis, Koheleth, and George Akiyama’s manga Ashura, Kato 
writes as follows: 
 
It is meaningless to murmur gloomily, “I wish I had never been born,” or 
to sing cheerfully, “I am glad I have been born.” … Since a person who 
                                                     
54 Smyth (2020), pp. 82, 85. 
55 Morioka (e2019). 
56 Morioka (e2019), p. 84. 
57 I have also called this a “life study approach” to the problem of life and death. See Epilogue of 
Morioka (e2005, 2017). If you find this touched your heartstrings, I recommend my 2017 paper “The 
Trolley Problem and the Dropping of Atomic Bombs” (Morioka, e2017). 
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has already been born can no longer do “that he was not born” — a 
strange way of putting it, but that is the only way to put it —, it is 
impossible to make a value judgment as to which is better or worse by 
comparing the situation in which one has been born (i.e., reality) and the 
situation in which one has not been born.58 
 
In 2009, I published a paper on the extinction of the human race by abstaining 
from procreation. It is the second chapter of the paper “Is There an Obligation to 
Produce Future Generations?” (The entire paper was co-authored by Masahiro 
Morioka and Shinogu Yoshimoto, and the second chapter was written by 
Morioka). At that time, I too did not know of the existence of Benatar’s book or 
Knight’s VHEMT. Independently of Benatar and Knight, I conducted a thought 
experiment in that chapter on the possibility of a “gentle self-erasing” of the 
human race by the voluntary cessation of procreation by women, and I argued in 
favor of their choice. I would say that the discussion of anti-procreationism in 
Japan actually dates back to at least the year 2009. As far as this 2009 paper is 
concerned, I could be regarded as a sympathizer of anti-procreationism in the 
sense that I would allow the extinction of the human race by gradually stopping 
childbirth.59 (As far as I know, the first scholar who discussed the planned 
extinction of the human race was Kazuyuki Kobayashi. He argued in his 1999 
paper “Is Our Future Valuable?: A Strategy for Extinction” that the planned 
extinction would be a rational alternative for us, although his argument was not 
made from an antinatalistic point of view.60) 
The above shows that two aspects of antinatalism — birth negation and 
procreation negation — were discussed in the years 2007–2009, independently 
of foreign discourses such as that of Knight, Benatar, or de Giraud. We can say 
that in Japan an academic discussion of antinatalism began at least in the period 
2007–2009. At that time, neither Kato nor I knew the word “antinatalism,” so we 
did not use it in our publications. It is worth noticing that both Kato and I had 
conducted research on Japanese bioethics — ethics of abortion for Kato and 
                                                     
58 Kato (2007), pp. 19-20. 
59 I also made a sympathetic statement about human extinction in the 2019 dialogue for the magazine 
Contemporary Thought (Morioka and Toya, 2019, p. 19). Those who criticize me for being a 
pronatalist are probably unaware of these facts. For example, in the comment section of the February 
2021 YouTube interview with me by The Exploring Antinatalism Podcast, someone named “maker 
rain” posted, “Masahiro Morioka is an infamous Pro-natalist here in Japan.” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=123mtxZXck0 (Accessed February 21, 2021). 
60 Kobayashi (1999). 
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ethics of disability and feminism for me — and through our research we 
encountered the problem of wrongful life lawsuits, in which a child born with 
disabilities accuses the physician for not having provided information to her 
parents, thinking that if the information had been provided then she would have 
never been born. This way of thinking is similar to that of birth negation. A 
controversy of wrongful birth might have influenced the Japanese academic 
discussion of antinatalism in its first stage. 
In 2010, Benatar’s asymmetry argument was introduced in Japan by Kato in 
his paper “Notes for ‘Freedom to Produce / Freedom to Be Born.’” In this paper, 
Kato cites Benatar’s asymmetry theory and writes that, “As Benatar says, we 
may have to accept the conclusion that procreation is always bad, and therefore 
the best thing is for all human beings to disappear from the earth. But frankly 
speaking, I am not able to fully understand his non-personal influence theory.”61 
This was probably the first time Benatar’s name appeared in the printed media in 
Japan. However, Kato did not yet use the term “antinatalism” there. 
The Japanese word “反出生主義 (pronounced as han shusshoh shugi or 
han shussei shugi),” which is the equivalent of the English word “antinatalism,” 
is considered to have first appeared on October 22, 2011, in the first edition of 
the Japanese Wikipedia entry “David Benatar.” This entry is believed to be 
created based on the same entry in the English Wikipedia. Since 2011, there 
have been many Internet websites or blogs that have dealt with antinatalism, but 
because their pages are constantly updated, it is difficult to pinpoint when the 
term “antinatalism” was first used on those sites. 
Google Trends shows that the cluster of searches of the word started roughly 
around 2013. 
 
                                                     
61 Kato (2010), p. 106. 
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In March 2013, my paper “Is Coming into Being Desirable?: On David 
Benatar’s Better Never to Have Been,” which is a critical review of Benatar’s 
book, was published in Japanese. There I wrote as follows.  
 
This is a book that meticulously examines the proposition, “It is better 
never to have been born,” using the methods of analytic philosophy. As a 
result, Benatar draws the conclusion that it would have been better if all 
human beings had never been born, and goes on to argue that the human 
race should become extinct as soon as possible. Benatar’s position 
belongs to the category of “antinatalism” in analytic philosophy, and his 
reflections have recently attracted a great deal of attention in the 
philosophy of the English-speaking world. (The most famous advocate of 
antinatalism is Arthur Schopenhauer.)62 
 
We can confirm from this quotation that in the Japanese academic world, the 
term “antinatalism” was introduced in 2013 as having two meanings: 1) “it 
would have been better if all human beings had never been born” and 2) “we 
must stop procreation and the human race must die out.” The above-mentioned 
paper was the first comprehensive introduction to Benatar’s argument, but 
looking back on it from the present point of view, we can find many incorrect 
understandings of his argument here and there. Also, the explanation of 
“antinatalism” there is not a good one. Anyway, it is important to note that the 
word “antinatalism” was introduced to Japan, along with Benatar’s philosophy, 
as a term for meaning both “birth negation” and “procreation negation,” which 
were discussed in the previous chapters. 
The first case in which the philosophy of Benatar was discussed at academic 
conferences was when I made a presentation entitled “Is There an Obligation to 
Produce Future Generations?” at a symposium of the 24th annual meeting of the 
Japanese Association for Bioethics held at Ritsumeikan University on October 
27, 2012. The second case was Fumitake Yoshizawa’s presentation “Asymmetry 
Concerning the Value of Being Born: A Counter Proposal to D. Benatar’s 
Argument” at the 5th annual meeting of the Japan Association for the 
Contemporary and Applied Philosophy at Nanzan University on April 21, 2013. 
However, in both cases, the word “antinatalism” was not used in the 
                                                     
62 Morioka (2013), p. 2. 
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presentations. In March 2014, Shinogu Yoshimoto published a Japanese paper 
entitled “Is Human Extinction Morally Appropriate?: David Benatar’s Theory of 
Harmful Birth and Hans Jonas’s Ethical Thought” in the philosophy journal 
Gendai Seimei Tetsugaku Kenkyu. This is a comparative study of the 
philosophies of Benatar and Jonas and is considered a pioneering work in this 
field. Yoshimoto uses the word “antinatalism” when talking about Benatar’s 
philosophy. This is perhaps the second case in which the word appeared in the 
printed media.63 
In 2013, I published the book Manga Introduction to Philosophy: An 
Exploration of Time, Existence, the Self, and the Meaning of Life with cartoonist 
Nyancofu Terada. In Chapter 4 of the book, I discussed birth negation in 
antinatalism from a philosophical point of view. The following pictures are 
examples of such discussions in the English translation of the book: 64 
 
                                                     
63 Yoshimoto (2014). A recent paper by Nao Murata (2021) is a comprehensive discussion of 
antinatalism from the perspective of philosophy of religion. 
64 Morioka and Terada (e2013, 2021), pp. 185-186. 
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In 2017, Benatar’s Better Never to Have Been was translated by Kazuo Kojima 
and Takayoshi Tamura. With this publication, Benatar’s arguments were 
available to a wider audience in Japan. The Real Argument Blog, a blog aiming 
at enlightening the public about antinatalism, was created on the Internet by 
anonymous (and possibly multiple) authors in 2017. They explicitly defined 
antinatalism as “the negation of procreation” and gave it the Japanese name “ア
ンチナタリズム” (pronounced anchi natarizumu). This blog had a huge impact 
on the subsequent antinatalists on the Japanese Internet and Twitter. Antinatalist 
activism in Japan is considered to have become visible with the launch of this 
blog. They vigorously introduced articles and information on antinatalism that 
had been accumulated mainly in the English-speaking world. This blog 
expanded the scope of Japanese antinatalism to include not only humans but also 
sentient organisms. We can see the influence of EFILilism and veganism here. In 
their article “Introduction to Antinatalism: An Easy-to-understand Explanation 
of Antinatalism — What Antinatalism Is and What It Is Not,” they define 
antinatalism as follows: 
 
Antinatalism is the opposite position of natalism, which promotes having 
children. Antinatalists believe that people should not have children. The 
words “should not” usually mean that it is morally wrong, and therefore it 
must not be done.65 
 
They define antinatalism as the position that “we should not have children.” And 
as for “our having been born,” they say the following: 
 
Antinatalists are not lamenting the fact that they have been born. Some of 
them might be so, but that has nothing to do directly with the thought of 
antinatalism. As we explained at the beginning, antinatalism is “should 
not create,” not the personal lament that “I wish I had never been born!”66 
 
It is a little difficult to understand this statement, but it is clear that these authors 
refuse to equate antinatalism with the personal lament that “I wish I had never 
been born.” However, it is not clear whether they believe that the proposition of 
                                                     




the harmful birth theory that “it is better not to be born” or “it would have been 
better not to have been born” is completely unrelated to antinatalism. 
In any case, this declaration had a lot of power. It was the influence of this 
blog that led to the emergence of antinatalists who called themselves “アンチナ
タリスト” (the same meaning as antinatalist, pronounced anchi natarisuto). 
After this, the understanding that antinatalism is the idea that people should not 
have children became a standard interpretation among Japanese grassroot 
antinatalists. This can be proved by the fact that when someone uses the phrase 
“I wish I had never been born” in the sense of antinatalism on Twitter, it is 
immediately refuted by antinatalists, saying that it is not antinatalism. 
In November 2019, the magazine Gendai Shiso (Contemporary Thought) 
published a special issue entitled “Considering Antinatalism: The Idea That It 
Would Have Been Better Never to Have Been Born,” which became the first 
book to feature the term “antinatalism” in its title. The focus of this special issue 
was philosophical examinations of the harmful birth theory using Benatar’s 
book as a starting point, and not much space was dedicated to the idea of 
anti-procreationism. This special issue became a hot topic in the reading world, 
and the public awareness of the term “antinatalism” advanced with the 
publication. The subtitle of this special issue, “The Idea That It Would Have 
Been Better Never to Have Been Born,” was taken from the title of Benatar’s 
book. The publication of the magazine may have helped broaden the 
understanding that antinatalism means birth negation, rather than procreation 
negation. 
In 2020, my aforementioned book Is It Better Never to Have Been Born? 
was published. In this book, I pointed out that there are two aspects of 
antinatalism: birth negation and procreation negation. In this book, much 
emphasis was placed on the history of ideas of birth negation. An interview with 
me appeared on the web edition of the Mainichi Newspaper on January 2, 2021, 
which was the first time the term “antinatalism” appeared in a national 
newspaper headline (other than in a book review). 
In January 2021, the Association of Anti-Procreationism in Japan was 
founded by Yuichi Furuno and Asagi Hozumi as a networking site for 
antinatalist activism in Japan. They state that they oppose “the creation of all 
beings that can feel pain.” They argue that all humans should not have children 
and should seek to become vegan. They also reject the production of sentient 
organisms by human hands, so it can be said that they have a broader 
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perspective than a type of antinatalism that targets only humans. 
The above is an outline of the introduction process of the term 
“antinatalism” into Japan until April 2021. As we have seen so far, the meaning 
of the term “antinatalism” has fluctuated many times between “birth negation” 
and “procreation negation.”  
It is also worth noticing that throughout Japanese history the idea of birth 
negation has not been a minor way of thinking. After Mahāyāna Buddhism was 
introduced in Japan in the 6th century, the reincarnation negation type of 
antinatalism became popular, and ordinary people believed the idea that this 
world was in its worst period. Many of them aspired to leave this hellish world 
and go to the pure land that is believed to exist in the western direction. This 
sentiment created an antinatalist layer in the traditional Japanese mindset. One 
hundred and fifty years ago, Japan opened its border and vigorously started 
importing Western ideas. The philosophy of Schopenhauer became popular 
among intellectuals and university students. Famous novelists such as 
Ryūnosuke Akutagawa and Osamu Dazai published novels that dealt with 
antinatalistic thoughts. Akutagawa wrote the Novel Kappa in 1927, in which the 
father of an imaginary creature, Kappa, puts his mouth on the genitals of the 
pregnant mother and talks to their fetus, “Reply to me whether you want to 
come out to this world!” and the fetus replies, “I do not want to be born because 
I do not want to inherit your mental illness and I believe that the existence of 
Kappa is bad.”67 Dazai wrote the novel The Setting Sun in 1947, in which a 
protagonist says, “Human life is so miserable. In reality, everyone thinks that it 
is better we had never been born.” She goes on to say, “Every day, from morning 
till night, I am waiting for something that is not here. I am too miserable. I want 
to rejoice in life, in human beings, in the world, and I want to be glad that I have 
been born.”68 Birth negation and birth affirmation have been among the most 
important themes in modern Japanese literature. 
In the realm of contemporary subculture, the theme of antinatalism 
frequently appears in the works of manga and anime. George Akiyama describes 
in his manga Ashura,69 published in 1970, the misery and resurrection of the life 
of a boy who cries alone, “I wish I had never been born. Gah!” (which is one of 
the most famous cries in the history of Japanese manga).  
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In the anime Pocket Monsters: Mewtwo Strikes Back!, released in 1998, 
Mewtwo, an artificially created Pokémon, says to humans, “Who asked you to 
give birth to me? Who asked you to make me? I have a strong grudge against all 
that have brought me into being,” and begins to fight back against humans.70 
This anime film became a big hit in Japan and other countries. In 2019, Mieko 
Kawakami published a novel entitled Summer Stories, which deals with the 
subject of antinatalism and reproductive ethics. In her novel, she lists Benatar’s 
book and one of my papers on antinatalism in the references. 71  Hajime 
Isayama’s manga series Attack on Titan, which was completed in April 2021, 
dealt heavily with antinatalistic thoughts in the last part of the story and made 
strong impressions on readers. One of the characters says, “If we hadn’t been 
born in the first place, we wouldn’t have had to suffer,”72 and there were readers 
who interpreted it as an expression of antinatalism. I believe that these cultural 
backgrounds have facilitated the development of contemporary antinatalism in 
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Japan. 
Finally, I would like to make two additional remarks. 
Firstly, I am sometimes criticized by Japanese antinatalists that I am a 
pronatalist and have no interest in the ethics of procreation, but this is 
completely wrong. With regard to the first point (pronatalist), I have already 
pointed out that I published a paper that dealt with human extinction positively. 
With regard to the second point (ethics of procreation), I would like to add the 
fact that I conducted philosophical investigations of the concept of procreation, 
independently of the discussion of antinatalism. For example, in my book 
Confessions of a Frigid Man: A Philosopher’s Journey into the Hidden Layers of 
Men’s Sexuality (2005, 2017), I discussed childbirth as a key concept of male 
sexuality, and in my article “Philosophical Investigations on the Concept of 
Procreation” (2014), I examined the concept of “procreation” analytically, both 
of which were my original contributions to this topic.  
Secondly, there are a lot of disagreements and fights in the antinatalist 
community on the Japanese Internet. 1) Antinatalists and anti-antinatalists 
sometimes accuse each other in offensive words. Some antinatalists accuse 
people who have procreated of practicing violence to their children; vice versa, 
some anti-antinatalists make derogatory remarks about antinatalists. The most 
common attack on antinatalists is, “Why don’t you kill yourself?” 2) There is a 
conflict between vegan antinatalists and non-vegan antinatalists. The former 
argues that the suffering of all sentient beings, including humans, should be 
reduced, while the latter argues that antinatalism should be applied only to 
humans. 3) There is a conflict between antinatalists who deny intercourse and 
antinatalists who affirm intercourse. The former argues that no matter how much 
contraception is practiced, the possibility of pregnancy due to intercourse never 
becomes zero; therefore, intercourse should not be permitted. The latter argues 
that it is okay to have intercourse if you use contraceptives because you can 
have an abortion in case of emergency. 4) There are complex conflicts between 
antinatalists and feminists. Feminists criticize that male antinatalists do not take 
into account women’s embodied experiences. Also, as for women’s right to give 
birth, which is one of women’s fundamental reproductive rights, feminists affirm 
it while antinatalists negate it. Furthermore, I once witnessed that on Twitter, 
when an antinatalist feminist accused men with offensive language, a 
non-antinatalist feminist criticized that antinatalist feminist’s nasty words. 5) 
There is a conflict between antinatalists who support euthanasia and antinatalists 
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who believe that euthanasia and antinatalism should not be linked together. 
There are also various opinions on whether eugenics or eugenic thoughts should 
be linked to antinatalism. 
 
 
* I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Asagi Hozumi for answering 
my questions, Mr. H for comments on the categorization of the concepts of 
antinatalism, and Amanda ‘Oldphan’ Sukenick and Mickael Holbek for their 
helpful information about antinatalist movements in the English-speaking 
world. 
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